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Non-technical summary
The systemic financial crisis which engulfed the global economy from 2008, along with the subsequent sovereign debt crisis in the euro area, has led to the need to reassess the relationship between financial conditions and real economic activity. Within the context of the Macroprudential Research Network (MaRs), organized by the ESCB, one of the three workstreams is devoted to examining this relationship and the channels through which it operates.
A prior question which arises is how exactly financial conditions should be depicted within models. Traditionally, macroeconometric models include only an interest rate. However, during periods of financial stress, changes in interest rates alone may not suffice to capture all the interactions between the financial system and the real economy. Variables such as credit aggregates, survey data reflecting the supply of loans and their terms and conditions, volatility in financial markets and spreads between various assets in different risk classes can all convey additional information on financial conditions and, in turn, influence economic activity through their effect on consumption, savings, investment and exports.
In this paper, we seek to construct indices of financial conditions for the euro area and for selected individual euro area countries, which can be used to explore further macro-financial linkages in the economy at large. We construct indices which both exclude and include monetary policy variables in order to examine the impact of monetary policy in mitigating the effects of the crisis. Based on economic theory, we choose a number of indicators describing financial market conditions and the stance of monetary policy. Then, using the method of principal components analysis, we condense the information content of these indicators into two indices for each economic area under consideration, one with and one without the effect of monetary policy. These indices cover the period 2003 to 2011 for the euro area as a whole; indices are also constructed for Germany, Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain.
The results can be summarized as follows. First, looking at the index for the euro area as a whole, the impact of events, such as the failure of major financial institutions, on financial conditions can be identified. Indeed, the index suggests that conditions deteriorated Second, as indicators of the monetary stance, we include both the policy rate and the net provision of liquidity by the Eurosystem (in both levels and rates of change). Comparing indices of financial conditions with and without monetary policy leads us to the conclusion that monetary policy has been 'leaning against the wind'. That is, in periods of deteriorating financial conditions, monetary policy has mitigated the deterioration; in periods of loosening financial conditions, monetary policy has operated to rein in the extent of the loosening.
Finally, we investigate the hypothesis that financial conditions across the euro area have been heterogeneous, both pre-and post-crisis. This assumption figures in a number of accounts of the development of the euro area crisis, and, particularly, those that focus on the build-up of unsustainable imbalances as a consequence of looser financial conditions in the periphery and tighter conditions at the centre. In the period following the crisis, liquidity pressures on banks have been particularly strong in peripheral countries. Indeed, our results suggest that, in the aftermath of the financial crisis and as the sovereign crisis unfolded, financial conditions in countries such as Greece and Portugal have deteriorated considerably, while those in Germany have steadily improved. The results provide support for the argument that financial conditions have been heterogeneous across the euro area and provide evidence of the disruption of monetary policy transmission.
I. Introduction
Mapping linkages between the financial system and the real economy has taken on a new significance and urgency following the systemic financial crisis which was triggered by high default rates among sub-prime mortgage loans. Following the failure of Lehman Brothers in the Autumn of 2008, the disruption of financial linkages and the appearance of dysfunctional financial markets -both the interbank and debt securities markets -generated widespread concern about the impact on the real economy.
The majority of econometric models, used either for forecasting or simulating the impact of shocks, have very little financial wiring. At best, they include interest rates.
At a time of dysfunctional markets, changes in interest rates alone may not capture all the interactions between the financial system and the real economy. Additionally, credit aggregates, survey data reflecting the supply of loans and their terms and conditions, volatility and spreads can all convey additional information on financial conditions and, in turn, influence growth via their effects on consumption, savings, investment and, ultimately, real economic activity.
For this reason, a number of authors have suggested the need to construct an index which reflects financial conditions. A financial conditions index (FCI) can be considered a natural extension of the monetary conditions index (MCI; see, for example, Federal Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 1996; Eika et al, 1996; Ericsson et al, 1997; Gerlach and Smets, 2000; Dudley and Hatzius, 2000) . It can be used for policy purposes to compare financial conditions across two periods or as an input to a forecasting model where interest rates alone seem insufficient. As a natural extension of the MCI literature, the FCI literature focuses on a much broader range of variables and not simply the interest rate and exchange rate commonly found in MCIs used in central banks. Such breadth has the advantage that it summarises a whole set of information describing conditions in the financial system in one series.
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FCIs are also related to Financial Stress Indicators (FSIs). In theory, an FSI suggests periods of fragility in financial markets and can be useful in facilitating early recognition of stress; an FCI is more useful in exploring macro-financial linkages (Carlson et al, 2012) . In practice, however, the two are often closely related, using similar variables as inputs. Indeed, Brave and Butters (2012) show that FCIs can predict stress. Moreover, since financial conditions are clearly affected during periods of financial stress, it is important to capture stress in any FCI.
The purpose of this paper is to construct an FCI for the euro area over the period 2003 to 2011. This permits us to undertake an exercise in mapping the narrative of financial conditions in the pre-and post-crisis periods. The impact of events, such as the failure of major financial institutions, can be identified. This is possible, because, unlike other papers where the index produced can prove difficult to interpret, one of the contributions of this paper is to produce an index which can then be used, as a first step, to describe the evolution of financial conditions over time. This is achieved by incorporating a wide range of data in a manner which would be predicted by economic theory. Whilst the resulting index cannot be used as an absolute measure of financial conditions, it does serve as a relative measure, tracking periods when conditions are looser and those when conditions are tighter. Moreover, it can be used for a range of purposes stretching from forecasting economic activity to investigating the effect of a tightening in financial conditions on investment, consumption etc. In this sense, it is comparable to recent indices constructed for the US and the euro area by Matheson (2011) , and for the US by Hatzius et al. (2010) and Swiston (2008) .
A second contribution of this paper is the study of the effects of monetary policy (both standard, i.e. interest rates, and non-standard, i.e. quantitative easing) on the evolution of the index. In most of the literature on FCIs, monetary policy has been accounted for through the inclusion of short-term interest rates. However, such an approach is clearly flawed in periods of financial stress and dysfunctional money markets and does not allow for a qualitative assessment of the effects of monetary 6 policy on financial conditions. In this paper, three monetary policy variables are included in one of the indices constructed. The resulting index is then compared to an index where these monetary policy variables are excluded and against an index in which the weights on the monetary policy variables have been set to zero. In both cases, evidence of monetary policy 'leaning against the wind' emerges from the comparison. This evidence is corroborated by a principal components analysis of the three policy variables.
A third contribution is to construct individual FCIs for selected euro area countries.
This allows us to investigate the hypothesis that financial conditions across the euro area diverged markedly both pre-and post-crisis. This assumption figures in a number of accounts of the development of the euro area crisis, and, particularly, those that emphasise the build-up of unsustainable imbalances as a consequence of looser monetary conditions in the periphery and tighter conditions at the centre. In the period following the crisis, liquidity pressures on banks have been particularly strong in peripheral countries, resulting in financial conditions being markedly tighter than in the centre.
Our results suggest that our index does indeed provide a better picture of financial conditions than is provided by looking at, say, just interest rates. Financial conditions in the euro area as a whole became progressively looser from mid-2003 up until the beginning of 2007; thereafter they tightened sharply. Aggressive monetary policy loosening by the ECB and, indeed, a number of central banks around the world turned the situation around resulting in loosening financial conditions, at least up until mid-2011. Thereafter the euro area sovereign debt crisis takes its toll, causing financial conditions to tighten again. Interestingly, our results also point to strong differences across countries, with the countries of the European south experiencing a stronger deterioration in conditions in the second half of 2011, something which is not evident in Germany where conditions continue to improve.
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The paper is organized as follows. In section II, we provide an overview of the literature on financial conditions indices. We also describe the data series that we have chosen to use and clarify how each series is incorporated into the index based on the direction of its effect on financial conditions. In section III, we discuss the methodology used to combine the data into an index of financial conditions. We have chosen to use principal components analysis because it does not involve estimation -it is derived from a linear transformation of the data series -and hence does not impose any structure. This contrasts with a large strand of the literature which estimates the weights to be applied to each series using structural models linking the financial sector to the real economy. In section IV, we present the indices and discuss the results. Finally, section V offers some conclusions.
II. Literature review
II.a Brief history of FCIs
The literature on financial conditions indices dates back to the early 2000s and was motivated, first, by evidence building up since the late 1980s on the importance of financial variables in the monetary policy transmission, and, second, by the boombust cycle in stock markets in the period 1995-2000 (commonly known as the dotcom bubble), which gave rise to heated policy debates as to whether central banks should take into account financial asset prices when deciding their policy stance.
More specifically, the credit channel literature (e.g. Bernanke and Gertler, 1995) highlights the role of financial market imperfections in propagating the effects of monetary policy on the economy, by leading to excessive responses of liquidityconstrained banks and firms. These are caused by the fact that restrictive monetary policy limits the lending resources available to banks (bank lending channel) 1 and, at the same time, raises the cost of external financing for firms with low net worth (balance sheet channel or financial accelerator). 2 The reduction in credit supply at a 8 time when firms need it most will lead to a propagation of the initial shock. Similar evidence can be found in the consumption literature. Zeldes (1989) shows that liquidity constraints may cause large fluctuations in consumption that are inconsistent with the permanent income hypothesis.
Related to the second motivating factor mentioned above, i.e. the relevance of financial asset prices for monetary policy, as Montagnoli and Napolitano (2004) report, three different strands of literature argue that: i) financial asset prices should be used exclusively to improve on central banks' forecasts of inflation Gertler, 1999, 2001) ; ii) they should form part of a broader price index targeted by central banks (Goodhart and Hofmann, 2000 ; or iii) that monetary policy should actively pursue a stabilization of asset prices around their fundamentals, just as it does with inflation (Cecchetti et al., 2000) .
Building on the MCIs used during the 1990s to assess the monetary policy stance, the first attempts to construct FCIs include asset prices (predominantly stock and housing prices) and money market rates and spreads, capturing the position and shape of the yield curve. Recent work on FCIs for the US features the inclusion of credit terms and conditions (Swiston, 2008; Hatzius et al. 2010 ).
In most of the initial work, the various components of the FCI are weighted, with weights derived either from structural models (Dudley and Hatzius, 2000; Goodhart and Hofmann, 2002) or reduced-form models (Mayes and Viren, 2001; Gauthier et al., 2004) . Principal Components Analysis is also commonly used (English et al. 2005; Forss Sandahl et al., 2011) (Goodhart and Hofmann, 2002; Montagnoli and Napolitano, 2004) or to forecast economic activity, inflation, investment or financial stress (English et al, 2005; Swiston, 2008; Hatzius et al. 2010; Brave and Butters, 2012) .
Most of the FCIs constructed in the literature appear to have good leading indicator properties, in the sense that they improve the forecasting performance of simple VAR models of economic activity -and its components, e.g. investment-(this result is common across most of the literature reviewed), while they also appear to forecast turning points (e.g. Gauthier et al. 2004) . The indices do a better job in forecasting economic activity than any of their individual components. By contrast, the evidence on the forecasting content of FCIs for inflation appears to be mixed (see Goodhart and Hofmann (2002) for positive evidence and English et al. (2005) for negative evidence). FCIs also improve the performance of Taylor-rules (Goodhart and Hofmann, 2002; Montagnoli and Napolitano, 2004) . Finally, they can help predict financial stress, at least up to horizons of one year ahead (Brave and Butters, 2012) .
One of the less prominent but important findings of the literature on FCIs is the asymmetry apparent between their peaks and troughs (Hansen, 2006) . Periods of heightened financial stress are more pronounced than periods of loose financial conditions. This finding is consistent with the empirical evidence from the financial accelerator literature, according to which financial market imperfections matter most in periods of negative shocks to economic activity. Another, possibly related, finding is that the forecasting performance of FCIs changes across different sample periods. It seems to be more pronounced throughout the 2000s than in the preceding period (see e.g. Dudley and Hatzius, 2000; Hatzius et al. 2010) . First, we focus on prices. If markets were perfect and cleared continuously, then prices would suffice to describe financial conditions completely (Swiston, 2008) . In general rising prices, whether of goods or assets, would be expected to indicate looser financial conditions. Rising goods prices are associated with falling real interest rates. Rising stock price or residential property prices are associated with an increase in the value of assets that can be used as collateral, making it easier for companies or households to borrow.
When market imperfections exist, prices in and of themselves are insufficient to describe financial conditions and quantities provide additional information. In a world better described as non neoclassical, a world with uncertainty and asymmetric information, quantities would have their role to play (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Hatzius et al, 2010) . Matheson (2011) also argues that quantities play an important role in periods of either extremely easy financial conditions or of extremely tight financial conditions. This seems relevant to the period under consideration here. In 4 See the Annex for more details on the specific variables used and their sources.
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the euro area, credit volumes are considered important since banks have traditionally played a stronger role than markets in providing finance to the real economy (Dudley and Hatzius, 2000) . To this end, we include in our FCI, the flow of loans to both non-financial corporations and households. In the light of the increasing importance of financial markets, as opposed to institutions, in financing firms in the euro area since the formation of the single currency, we also include debt securities issues of non-financial and financial corporations. Higher rates of growth of credit provision or securities issues are assumed to signal looser financial conditions.
Periods of easy finance and tight finance are often accompanied by strong movements in risk premia as manifest in various interest rate spreads. Our period is no exception. We include a variety of spreads in the FCI. Higher loan-to-deposit spreads (for both nonfinancial corporations and households -both mortgages and consumer loans) indicate tighter conditions in the provision of credit to the private sector. Spreads in the interbank market can also be indicative of funding stress for financial institutions -indeed, one characteristic of the present crisis has been the drying up of the interbank market at various times and to various degrees. This is usually manifested in a rise in spreads between overnight borrowing and longerterm borrowing. Thus we include the spread between the 3-month Euribor rate and EONIA. Finally, sovereign spreads over the perceived safe haven of German government bonds indicate increasing stress in bond markets segments. In general, higher spreads are indicative of tighter financial conditions.
A common sign of heightened tension in financial markets is given by measures of the volatility of prices in those markets. Higher volatility is associated with tighter financial conditions. We include volatility measures capturing the volatility of euro area stock prices (the volatility of the STOXX index) along with a measure of implied volatility in bond markets.
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We also exploit the information contained in survey data. The bank lending survey in euro area countries is undertaken quarterly, under the coordination of the ECB. It encompasses factors such as the access of banks to market funding, banks' liquidity positions and the prospects for housing markets, along with consumer and firm creditworthiness. Swiston (2008) has shown that the data from bank surveys can be extremely useful in providing a picture of credit availability in the US. These measures allow us to capture supply of credit effects in contrast to quantities of credit granted which could also reflect demand conditions. Hence we include these measures in our index.
Finally, monetary policy variables are included in one version of the FCI constructed for the euro area. An increase in net liquidity provided by the Eurosystem or its growth rate is interpreted as contributing to a loosening of financial conditions (and vice versa). Similarly, a cut in the policy rate represents a loosening of financial conditions.
III. Methodology
Our empirical approach consists of extracting principal components from a large dataset of the above-mentioned financial and credit series covering all aspects of financial conditions. These are subsequently studied individually and then combined into what we define as a financial conditions index, with a view to interpreting their intertemporal evolution against the backdrop of the financial crisis timeline.
Principal components analysis models the variance structure of a set of observed variables, using linear combinations of the variables themselves. It is a way of identifying patterns in the data, of expressing the data in such a way as to highlight their similarities and differences. Once these patterns (or components) have been identified, the data can be compressed without much loss of information. In other words this is essentially a variable reduction process and, as such, it is appropriate when one has a large set of data and needs to condense it into a smaller number of 13 artificial variables that will account for most of the variance in the dataset. Such a need may arise from the belief that there is some redundancy in the data, in the sense that a number of the variables may be thought to primarily reflect the same underlying fundamentals. Seen another way, one may be interested in studying only the primary drivers of a dataset, which are likely to be both more manageable and more easily interpretable, and may thus wish to abstract from the remaining noise without however employing a structural framework which would a priori impose a set of beliefs on the resulting series. each accounts for a maximal amount of the dataset's remaining variance (that which has not already been accounted for by the preceding components) and is uncorrelated with all of the preceding components. Thus, they account for a progressively smaller share of the original dataset's variance, the bulk of the information having been summarized in the first few components, i.e. in the principal ones.
The loadings of each variable in the linear combinations may be used to provide an interpretation for the principal components, while the principal components themselves, in which the bulk of the dataset's information has been distilled, may be used in subsequent analysis as summary variables.
In order to ensure that the extracted principal components are not unduly influenced by the measurement units and relative magnitude of individual series, all of the variables have been normalised, i.e. they have been demeaned and divided by 14 their standard deviations. As the empirical framework employed involves no estimation and thus no error term, consisting essentially of a transformation of the data matrix, we do not difference the data to ensure stationarity. 5 This is convenient because, not only is the idea that economically meaningful variables may have unit roots counterintuitive but also because our main concern in this exercise is the interpretability of the extracted components, which would have been severely hindered by differencing the data, as noted by English et al. (2005) .
Moreover, wherever needed, the data have been transformed to take into account the way in which each series associates with financial conditions. For example, spreads and volatilities have been included with the opposite sign. Thus, in the final dataset, an increase in any series reflects an easing of credit conditions. This is crucial to constructing an FCI which may enhance our understanding of how financial conditions have evolved over the period of study, as movements in the index will also be interpretable in the same way.
In deciding which components to use in the construction of the financial conditions index, the threshold for the share of total variance explained was set at 70%. By this measure, the first 3 principal components suffice to summarise the euro area dataset. For the country indices, the same threshold criterion leads to retaining the first four principal components. The financial conditions indices are then constructed, in each case, by summing the selected principal components weighted by the share of total variability explained by them. The resulting indices are then further divided by the exact share of total variance cumulatively explained in each case, to ensure comparability between them. Table 1 describes the exact contribution of each series to the first 3 principal components in our dataset (i.e. the loadings), along with the share of total variance explained by each component and, thus, the share of overall variance explained by the resulting index. The components are ordered conventionally in descending order of the share of overall variance explained. Figure 1 graphs the first three principal components.
IV. Results
IV.a Euro area principal components
First, we examine the loading weights presented in Table 1 Second, the actual importance of each variable in the financial conditions index is equal to the weighted sum of the loadings on each variable across the 3 principal components. This is presented in column 4 of Finally, the fact that the monetary policy variables are only 3 out of 24 (in the euro area dataset) implies that, by construction, they have a smaller weight than the nonmonetary policy variables. In short, the effect of monetary policy, as captured by either comparison, is not expected to be great in terms of magnitude. In order to somehow account for that, we undertake a third investigation of our dataset. This involves performing principal components analysis on the three monetary policy variables and examining the evolution of the resulting first principal component against the FCI.1, in an effort to yet again confirm our main conclusions in a framework which affords monetary policy more weight. . 8 In interpreting this finding, one may draw parallels to the literature on the zero lower bound of nominal interest rates. Therein it is argued that, once in a "liquidity trap", the monetary policy authorities have no other policy option, in the face of deflation and recession, than to resort to unconventional measures such as quantitative easing, but it is also acknowledged that in practice these may prove to have a very limited effect on inflation and output. Similarly, one may conjecture that these same non-standard measures may also be relatively ineffective in maintaining stable and smooth financial conditions. Furthermore, Bernanke et al. (2004) find evidence that the importance of central bank communication may be elevated when the policy rate is constrained by the zero lower bound. For example, they argue that the central bank may be able to impart additional stimulus to the economy by persuading the public that the policy rate will remain low for a longer period than was previously expected. Additionally, they suggest that quantitative easing may also work through a signalling channel, if its implementation is such that it conveys the message the central bank will not quickly reverse large amounts of quantitative easing or signals a general willingness to break from the cautious and conventional policies of the past. By analogy, to the extent that maintaining smooth credit conditions is an implicit target of the central bank during a crisis, communicating a strong commitment to the achievement of this target may be critical, especially at the zero lower bound. In this context, some analysts have argued that the ECB's handling of the sovereign debt crisis was less effective in conveying the message of a whole-hearted and unwavering commitment to maintaining stable and smooth financial conditions, than that of e.g. the FED. Tables 2 and 3 Table 2 , we present the weighted loadings for each variable by country. Once again there is evidence that monetary policy 'leans against the wind', although, not surprisingly, given that monetary policy is set with the whole euro area in mind, the results are slightly weaker. Hence, the interest rate policy appears with the correct negative sign 10 and so does net liquidity provision by the Eurosystem in all periphery countries. However, the growth of net liquidity appears with the wrong sign (e.g. it acts to reinforce financial conditions) in Greece and in Spain. Moreover, in the case of Germany, the nonstandard monetary policy measures appear with a 'wrong' positive sign, reflecting the fact that this is the only country in our dataset for which net liquidity from the Eurosystem has declined over the sample period.
IV.b A euro area FCI
IV.c Individual country FCIs: the core versus the periphery
Additionally, only very few other variables (such as one of the spreads between loan and deposit rates and, in the case of Germany, two survey questions) also enter with the wrong sign in the sense that something that should reflect a tightening of financial conditions appears to loosen them. Germany. Taking the euro area as our benchmark, it appears that financial conditions in Germany before the Lehman Brothers collapse were loosening quite quickly. The trend pre-Lehman is considerably steeper than that of the euro area as a whole. Moreover, monetary policy, if anything, is contributing to a slightly steeper 10 It should be noted that, in the case of Ireland, we include 4 monetary policy variables since we split liquidity provision into standard liquidity provision and nonstandard. This split generates a more sensible loading weight on the policy rate which is otherwise positive. Overall this slightly different approach generates more easily interpretable results as we discuss below. 11 The 'wrong' sign on the spreads between loan and deposit rates in countries like Greece may reflect the relatively sharp increase in deposit rates that took place in an attempt to stem ongoing deposit flight.
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loosening. The impact of Lehman Brothers' failure is stark and it would appear that an even speedier rate cut may have been appropriate for Germany. Thereafter, financial conditions have slowly improved. There is no evidence of the deterioration seen in conditions in the euro area in the last 6 months of 2011. On the contrary, in terms of levels, Germany seems to have recovered to its pre-crisis financial conditions. With this in mind, from the perspective of Germany, the "leaningagainst-the-wind" effect of monetary policy may have been called for.
This outcome contrasts with the situation in Spain, Greece, Ireland and Portugal (see comes at a penalty rate, in some countries.
wrong to respond by loosening monetary policy further, as opposed to a situation in which the same conditions were due to a negative demand shock. 14 This result is even stronger if we do not split central bank liquidity provision into standard and nonstandard provision and is another reason why we chose to split liquidity provision in the case of Ireland. 
IV.d The euro area FCI against monetary policy variables
Thus far, the analysis has been based on the effect of including three monetary policy variables within a fairly large dataset of financial and credit variables.
However, within such a framework, monetary policy has a small overall weight by construction. In order to account for this issue, we undertake one final investigation of our euro area dataset which affords monetary policy more weight. Principal components analysis has been performed on the three monetary policy variables and the resulting first principal component has been plotted against the euro area financial conditions index without monetary policy variables (FCI1) in Figure 9 .
Monetary policy appears to roughly mirror the FCI from mid-2005 to the end of 2008, i.e. it appears to be "leaning against the wind" both during the pre-crisis credit easing and during the Lehman Brothers plunge. The same appears to have been the 15 Moreover, it should be noted that principal components analysis by construction explains variability in the data. To the extent that developments in the periphery contributed more to the overall volatility of euro area data than those in the core of the euro area (i.e. more than their GDP-derived weights would imply), the principal components obtained from the euro area dataset will be geared more towards explaining developments in the periphery.
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case recently, in the second half of 2011. However, during the unfolding of the sovereign debt crisis, monetary policy appears to provide only limited easing of financial conditions. Analogous conclusions are drawn from an examination of the lower panel of Figure 9 , where an index constructed from all three monetary policy principal components has been plotted. Table 4 presents the corresponding correlation analysis, which provides further confirmation of the overall "leaning against the wind" effect of monetary policy. Thus, this final exploration of the data corroborates our earlier analysis.
V. Conclusions
This paper has sought to construct indices of financial conditions for the euro area 
